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NEW YORK PRACTICE COVtRAGE

recovery where they were incurred by the plaintiff in defending
a prior action necessitated by the wrongful act of the defendant. 2
The issue becomes somewhat more unclear when, instead of suing
for legal expenses previously incurred in a subsequent litigation,
the defendant impleads his indemnitor. However, the court in
the instant case did not feel compelled to decide this question,
since the jury concluded that the manufacturer was not guilty
of any wrongful act.
ARTICLE

30 -

RE

EDIES AND PLEADING

Punitive Damages: Available where there is gross negligence.
Although negligence cases dealing squarely with punitive
damages are few, there is dictum that such damages are re29
coverable in instances of gross negligence or reckless conduct.
Some negligence cases have conceded the propriety of punitive
damages while disallowing their actual award on collateral
grounds.30 Caldwell v. New Jersey Steamboat Co.,3 often cited
for the proposition that gross negligence justifies punitive damages,
held that the facts there did not indicate such a degree of
negligence.
In all of these cases, the soundness of imposing
punitive damages has never been the critical issue. The Caldwell
court avoided an unequivocal endorsement of such an imposition
by relying on the failure to meet the vague standard of "gross
32
negligence." The recent decision in Soucy v. Greyhound Corp.,
apparently the first reported case so holding, foreclosed that
avenue of retreat by holding that the plaintiff's allegations of
fact, 33 if proven, would meet the standard of gross negligence
28 Madison County Constr. Co. v. State, 177 Misc. 777, 31 N.Y.S2d 883

(Ct. CI. 1941).
29 Voltz v. Blackmar, 64 N.Y. 440, 444 (1876)

(assault and battery);

Noonan v. Luther, 119 App. Div. 701, 703, 104 N.Y. Supp. 684, 686

(3d

Dep't 1907) (assault and battery); DeMarrasse v. Wolf, 140 N.Y.S.2d 235,
238 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1955) (malicious prosecution); Darr v. Cohen,
94 Misc. 471, 478, 158 N.Y. Supp. 324, 328 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1916)
(nuisance abatement). See generally 14 N.Y. JuR. Dauages § 181 (1960).

30 Powers v. Manhattan Ry., 120 N.Y. 178, 24 N.E. 295 (1890) (jury
not apprised of necessity of finding gross negligence); Cleghorn v. New
York Cent. & Hudson River R.R., 56 N.Y. 44 (1874) (jury not apprised
of necessity of finding gross negligence); Millard v. Brown, 35 N.Y. 297
(1866) (defendant prevented from proving facts tending to show his negli-

gence was not gross).
3147 N.Y. 282 (1872).
3227 App. Div. 2d 112, 276 N.Y.S.2d 173 (3d Dep't 1967) (motion to
amend complaint to ask for punitive damages).
33 Plaintiff was injured when bus in which she was riding left the road
and rolled over. It was alleged that the bus was old, was equipped with
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and thus warrant punitive damages. The soundness of the
punitive damages policy is now directly in issue since the court,
by setting the stage for an actual award of punitive damages,
terminated the ambivalence of New York's position.
While this development is significant from the scholar's point
of view, it is of lesser import in a practical sense. The scarcity
of reported punitive damages cases itself testifies that few such
cases have ever reached the courts, probably for practical reasons.
Conduct which might possibly be called "gross negligence" unquestionably constitutes ordinary negligence. A defendant guilty
of such conduct would probably offer a substantial settlement
to avoid potential punitive liability. To a plaintiff, a large immediate
settlement would offer an attractive alternative to a recovery,
which, though possibly larger, would come after years of delay.
Furthermore, since most automobile liability insurance policies
do not cover punitive damages,"4 such a recovery could be an
empty victory. It is doubted, therefore, that the recent case will
provide a sufficient incentive to offset these practical considerations
and thereby effect a countertrend. However, in the rare case,
that does reach court, 35 Soucy will provide direct authority for
granting punitive damages.
CPLR 3018(b).: Amendment allowed to insert an
affirnative defense.
CPLR 3018(b) provides that certain matters, "which if not
pleaded would be likely to take the adverse party by surprise . . .,"
must be pleaded as affirmative defenses under penalty of being
waived.36
However, the apparent severity of this section is
alleviated by the liberal provisions for amending pleadings in
CPLR 3025.
37
This is illustrated by the recent decision in Rainone v. France.
There the defendant in a negligence action had failed to include
the defense of general release in his original answer because he
was unaware that plaintiff had accepted $425 to release defendant's
joint tortfeasor. Upon learning of tis release four and one-half
months later, the defendant applied to the court for permission
to amend his answer. Although section 3018(b) specifically
applies to the defense of release, the court permitted the amendworn tires, was speeding, had a defective transmission, and had defective
windshield wipers.
34 Logan, Punitive Damages in Automobile Cases, 1961 INs. LJ. 27, 30.

35 E.g., where defendant mistakenly feels he has a debatable affirmative

defense such as contributory negligence or assumption of risk.

36 The section gives several examples of such matters, but expressly
provides that those enumerated are not exclusive.
3

26 App. Div. 2d 855, 273 N.Y.S.2d 828 (3d Dep't 1966).

